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THE HUMAN BEING IS NOT THE ABSOLUTE* 
An interview with the Rev. Prof. Stanisi'aw Kowalczyk, Ph.D., The Chair-person 
of Social Philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin, Poland. 
by Marian Pilka 
Pilka: More and more often one hears a claim that we arc already living in the post­
atheistic epoch, that is, in a period in which the problem of God is not only being decided 
negatively but it has altogether ceased to be a problem. Indifferent neutrality has taken the place of 
the struggle against God. The nineteenth century dispute about the existence of God, about the 
nature of the creation and universe, about the sense of existence, came to an end with the exit of 
the main actors from the stage, le�wing it empty. 
Kowalczyk: During one of the meetings of European Catholic bishops somebody said 
that we were living in both post-Christian and post-atheistic Europe. At the very beginning it 
should be noted that wide-spread atheism, which appeared in the 19th century, was an heir of 
Christianity and that is why in a post-atheistic period Christianity cannot be declared as "a clean 
slate"; it cannot simply be treated as nonexistent. For example, such values as justice, humanism, 
freedom, or equality, are actually incorporated by atheistic doctrines from the Christian ethos. We 
can see it quite clearly in the ideological dependences of and influences on Hegel, then in Hegel's 
influence on Feuerbach and the latter's philosophy of human being as well as on Marx's social 
philosophy. For those thinkers the problem of god had a fundamental nature. Hegel himself 
"translated" theology into the language of philosophical pantheism. Feucrbach went one step 
further: he deified the human being and interpreted God as a product of human imagination. Marx 
negated the existence of the Deity, as if transferring its attributes to the collective as a creator of 
the human being. Atheistic doctrines arc unable to free themselves not only from the cultural 
heritage of the Gospel but also from the very idea of God. Nineteenth-century atheism, which went 
down in history as a challenge to Christianity, not only constituted a threat to it but also partly 
caused its ptirification; it led to the death of the God of deformed Christianity. 
Pilka: But this nineteenth-century theology of atheism is in fact dead. No emotion is any 
longer aroused .bY the propagators of atheism who arc regarded as maniacal doctr.inaires. There are 
no more great "theologians" of atheism. 
Kowalczyk: It.is true, yet although mheism did not survive, some of its forms have 
remained. Dead is the atheism that was fideistic, aggressive-factional, arrogant and optimistic, 
based on scientism and rationalism, assuming a possibility of constructing an ethics and 
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explaining the sense of the world on the basis of the advances of natural sciences and a possibility 
of realizing a socio-economic utopia. Today it is more and more commonly acknowledged that it 
was the god of the atheists that died, Nietzsche's god-superman, Feuerbach's god-the human 
being, �Iarx's god-social class, Sartre's god-apotheosis of individual existence and its freedom; 
the god-<Jf nation::li socialism-race. It is becoming obvious that the human being cannot be the 
Absolute; the faith in the "divine" auributes of the human being or the collective, in the 
omniscience, omnipotence, all-goodness has disappeared. "The king has proved to be naked", for it 
is not God that alienates the human being, but a degraded god, an idol which is the surrogate of 
God. What was recognized as liberation in the previous century has now turned out to be a curse or 
a blind alley. The words of Sartre's protagonist, Goetz, arc characteristic in this context "I killed 
God because He had driven me away from people. And now His death drives me still further away 
from them." [In the "Devil and Good God".] The world "freed" from God becomes ail empty and 
homeless world, plunged into the absurd or into a struggle wasting people away. 
Pilka: It seems that the most characteristic contemporary attitude towards religion is the 
agnostic attitude. 
Kowalcz\·k: Yes. However, atheism and agnosticism arc in fact significantly differed: 
atheism negates the existence of God, while agnosticism suggests that we cannot say anything 
certain about God. yet, in practice, both attitudes arc similar in existential experience. An example 
may be found, for instance, in the English philosopher, Bertrand Russell, who formally declared 
himself an agnostic, while actually opting for atheism with abandonment. The teaching of the 
latest Vatican Council regards agnosticism as a form of atheism. The classification is valid on the 
psychological, pastoral plane. The agnostic atLitudc leads to practical and doctrinal atheism. 
Epistemological agnosticism is very important in the shaping of atheistic atLitudcs and doctrines. 
Its roots go back to two thinkers, Humc and Kant. The former gave birth to empirical 
a�nosticism, granting the status of scientific cognition only to sensory experience. Kant, in tum, 
joining the trend of idealism, closed himself within the compass of one's own subjectiveness and 
subjectivism, from which there is no passage to real God. Both forms of agnosticism restrict the 
range of human cognition to the \\•orld of events, while renouncing the study of the inner nature of 
the world and nun. This ontological phenomenalism and epistemological relativism give no real 
basis for the sc:.1rch of God. Closing itsdf within the circle of empirically cognizable phenomena 
and subjective C .'. pcricnces, agnosticism leads to the self-mutilation fo the human mind and makes 
it impossible to rc:::ch the mysterious presence of transcendental God. 
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Pilka_: Touching the problem of agnosticism, which functions as common awareness 
ralher Lhan as an intellectually considered Lheory of knowledge, you have mentioned Lhe question of 
Lhe philosophical premises of atheism. 
Kowalczyk: It is true that in common alheism intellectual constructions have no essential 
significance. Still, one should remember Lhat it is Lhe philosophy predominant in a given period­
or ralher those elements of this philosophy that penetrate into popular consciousness-that 
constitutes one of the main factors determining the paradigm of every culture in which the human 
being grows up and develops his/her vision of reality, his/her sensibility and his/her feeling of 
his/her own sense. That is why the problem of the philosophical background of atheism has a 
character which is not only a theoretical but also practical. 
Pilka: You have also mentioned the epistemological causes of atheism. 
Kowalczyk: It should be added that such systems as analytical philosophy or nco­
positivism, while rejecting all philosophical methods other than those of exact and formal 
sciences, negate Lhe reasonableness of metaphysical theses, while the acceptance of God is regarded 
by them as an attitude resulting from irrational impulses. The ninetecnlh century developed a way 
of thinking called scicntism which was an unjustifics extrapolation of scientific cognition into the 
domain of philosophy. Negating transcendent cognition, scientism itself created a specific 
metaphysics in which the possibilities of human cognition were raised to the status of the 
absolute. Representatives of scientism believed Lhat in time empirical sciences would take over the 
functions of ethics, metaphysics, and religion. 
Pilka: Yet atheism has not only epistemological but also ontological causes. 
Kowalczyk: Yes and also causes derived from anlhropology and comparative religion. The 
original sin of ontological alheism is the temptation of monism, namely, a desire to reduce all 
reality to one proto-clement, matter or idea. Spinoza and Hegel, who depersonalized and de­
individualized God by identifying God with the visible world, succumbed precisely to this 
temptation. The temptation of monism, bewitching the human being with a unidimensional 
solution of the enigma for the world, leads to a logical contradiction. For if reality is a 
homogeneous being, then at the same time it is both· matter and consciousness, change and 
durability, essence and attribute, etc. The internally contradictory being cannot be understood 
because the absurd is incomprehensible. The most frequent form of monism is precisely 
materialism which leads to Lhe objectification of the human being depriving the human being of 
all Lhe "human attributes." For matter is 
incapable of creating a sense of being. Nor can it be a creator of values and properties 
which go beyond its nature, such as spiritual life, truth, love, good. 
Pilka: But by proving the philosophical invalidity of atheism you have not specified what 
atheism actually is. 
Kowalczvk: Perhaps one should first of all ask if atheism is at all possible. Many 
thinkers, such as KicrkcgaarJ, Scheler, Dlomkl or de Lubac, arc of the opinion that every person 
believes in something, in God or in gods. I\inetccnth-century atheism was a religion of created 
gods. Every person looks for points of reference in his/her life. He/She looks for something 
absolute, which would resist the wave of changes. Rejecting God, he/she deifies either the human 
being or human products. In this sense it is possible to speak about the religious dimension of 
atheism. In the philosophical sense, atheism is a negation of God, but as a phenomenon it is very 
complex, not only doctrinally but also psychologically, sociologically, etc. For these reasons 
atheism may be defined in various terms, in philosophical, theological, sociological, pastoral. I 
think that the best definition of atheism has been formulated by Vatican II, i. c. the severance of 
living tics with God or the negation of their possibility. For a sociologist atheism means the 
disappearance of religious practices, while in comparative religion it means the absence of a 
religious cult. 
Pilka: Contemporary atheism is connected with the idea of freedom and the liberation of 
the human being from religion which is reputedly a cause of his/her alienation. Hence, at its basis 
we find a very characteristic humanistic clement. 
Kowalczyk: This "humanistic atheism" links such different thinkers as Nietzsche, Marx, 
and Sartre. But many other things divide them. In Nietzsche there is biologism and vitalism in his 
perception of the human being; in Marx-economism; in Sartrc-idcalistic subjectivism. 
Nietzsche and Sartre endorsed extremist individualism, while Marx-extreme collectivism. Yet, in 
spite of all that, they share the same altitude: the negation of God in the name of the human being 
and his/her autonomy, for the sake of social progress. They share humanism without God and 
against God. The Absolute was regarded by them as human projection and the submission to it led 
to human alienation from the domain of mundane affairs. Most often God has been rejected for the 
sake of human freedom. Especially i'\ietzsche and Sartre demanded unlimited freedom for the 
individual. But the apotheosis of the human individual cannot be identified with the proper 
appraisal of the human being as the person. unlimited external freedom docs not yet mean internal 
freedom. The latter is a freedom of spiritual maturity and responsibility for the fate of the next of 
kin, of serving them by creating the necessary \'alucs. Egocentric individualism docs not see a 
neighbor in another person but only an enemy. On the other hand, in Marx's collectivism the 
"liberation" from Gocl exacts a comiderable price to be paid, namely, becoming dependent on the 
human being, relying on the good or bad will of the collective. Marx looked at God through thl?. 
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prism of Greek Zeus and that is why the dethronement of God was regarded as a conditio sine qua 
non of full humanism in which the human being was the only god. That Greek image of the diety 
has nothing in common with Christ who gave His life for us. The conception of the human being 
"liberated" from God for his/her own sake, although it gave rise to various socio-political systems, 
was an element of their ideological and philosophical affinity. A consequence of this affmity is the 
fact that inany former Marxists pass over to the attitude of liberal individualism while, for 
instance, an adherent of extreme individualism, Sartre, sympathized with the doctrine of Marxism. 
The common feature of both these trends is the questioning of the personal nature of the human 
being. It should be added that in time the slogan of liberation served as a screen for human 
exploitation. Thus understood freedom leads to "the dictatorship fo the capital," "the dictatorship of 
the race," or "the dictatorship fo the proletariat." Freedom without God degenerates into human 
enslavement, internal or external. 
fi.J]m: In its foundations each. culture is a certain religious-moral order. How does 
contemporary atheism, negating this order, influence its shape and character? 
Kowalczyk: Christianity undoubtedly constitutes the foundation of European culture. 
Leszek Kolakowski, at that time still a Marxist, was quite right when he said.: "Any attempt to 
nullify Jesus, to eliminate Him from our culture, is ridiculous and barren. The person and 
teachings of Jesus Christ cannot be removed from our culttire, if this culture is to exist and be still 
created." Contemporary atheism has an evident anti-Chri�tian profile. Nietzsche declared war 
against the Galilean. Thus understood atheism means tearing away Europe from its own roots. And 
this uprooting is identical with the death of European culture. The threat to European culture posed 
by atheism is manifold. First of all, both in the materialist version and in idealistic existentialism, 
it means a departure from the personalist conception of the human being. The human being is 
regarded as "thinking matter" by Marxism, and "a tamed animal" by Nietzsche, "the seat of the 
subconscious" by Freud, or "ontological absurdity" by Sartre. The consequence of the 
depersonalization of the human being is to be found in his/her degradation to the role of a producer 
to a consumer. John Paul II speaks about the materialistic civilization which accepts the primary 
of things over person. In this complex conception of the human being the sense of life is found in 
"having" rather "being." Therefore, it is not surprizing that in some atheistic doctrines there appear 
element of pessimism, nihilism, and despair. 
Pilka: The influence of atheism is perhaps most evident on the plane of ethics. 
Kowalczyk: It concerns not only doctrinal atheists but also multitudes who are Christians 
in name only. They even speak about the so-called "atheism of the faithful," that is, about the 
permanent neglect of the norms of religious ethics by the l�tithful. The primacy of economy or of 
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"having!' over ethics unavoidably leads to the relativization of the latter. That is why Nietzsche 
spoke of "the shauered table of Moses," juxtaposing traditional ethics, "the ethics of the slave," to 
his own ethics of "supermen." Historical materialism regards ethics as a form of ideological 
superstructure, as a historically relative product of econo!Tiic base. A characteristic feature of th� 
ethics of contemporary "secular humanists" is found in the permanent separation of the ideas of 
love �nq of justice. The latter is considered to be a sufficient basis for "the humanistic ethical 
conception." It should be emphasized that many socio-political trends, which describe themselves 
as "humanistic," often violate the basic human rights and of nations. Love without justice is an 
empty slogan, but justice without the support of love may merely become a pretext for human 
destruction. How often are people killed in the name of humanity, appealing to the demands of 
justice! Thus, the desacralization of life and ethics leads to dehumanization. 
Pilka: Is the vision of the civilization based on the atheistic paradigm, excluding the 
absolute and universal status of values, capable of providing answers to the basic existential 
questions? 
Kowaiczyk: What are these questions? These are question which involve the totality of 
the person and which, therefore, concern such values as freedom, happiness, friendship, love, sense 
of life. These questions concern the depth of the human person and its inner mystery. Asking 
them, a person goes beyond the domain of the world of things and enters the realm of absolute and 
universal values. Mod�m civilization, based on the advances in natural sciences, has worked out an 
empirical-mathematical model of the human being, which is a mutilated vision of the person. That 
is why these sciences are incapable of providing an adequate description of the person-of a free, 
thinking subject-and even less can they indicate its sense. The sense of human life goes beyond 
the world of matter dealt with by natural sciences. Modem civilization is directed towards the 
conquest and transformation of the cosmos and the reality surrounding us; hence it is restricted to 
the realm of the world of things. However the person uses things but cannot perceive in them the 
sense of its existence, since it would then mean its ontological self-degradation. 
Pilka: It seems that modem civilization not only avoids basic existential questions but 
actually tries to exclude asking them� 
Kowalczyk: Here we return to the problem mentioned by you at the beginning of our 
conversation. Personally, I am of the opinion that indifference to the problems of the ultimate 
conditioning of human existence is a superficial phenomenon. At present we are observing a 
strong revival of at least the problem of giving sense to human existence, if not of the question of 
the absolute. I do not think that this century can be characterized by the extinction of religious 
feelings. Marx prophesized that "the atheism of negation" would be followed by "factual atheism," 
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that is, by the burning out of transcendental aspirations in human minds and hearts, but his 
prophesy has not come true. 
Pilka: But it is a fact that contemporary culture, especially in its mass-scale variant, does 
not favor the development of religious or even reflective altitudes. 
Kowalczyk: It is true, yet its influence docs not have a doctrinal character but is mainly 
limited f() �e shaping of existential attitudes. The threat-to religion as well as to deeper 
dimensions of culture-consists in making shallow human problems, in stripping the human 
being, in practice, of the transcendental dimension and restricting the human being to the realm of 
sensory experiences. The accumulation of sensations, especially through the mass media to which 
contemporary people are exposed, causes an inhibition of their inner growth. The superficial 
treatment and the trivialization of human existence, so characteristic of modem times, lead not so 
much to doctrinal atheism but rather to practical atheism, to a lasting conflict between moral 
norms and the life style of modern generations: they lead to the atrophy of prayer and 
philosophical-ethical reflection, to indifferent, neutral aLtitudes. In this respect we observe 
phenomena which may be described as post-Christian and, at the same time, post-atheistic. The 
negative influence of the mass media on religious-moral life is particularly emphasized in those 
countries in which the media are monopolized by the state proclaiming an atheistic ideology. 
Pilka: The conduct of people is conditioned by norms created by the environment in 
which they live. Since the times of the French Revolution we have observed tendencies to 
secularize not only culture but also various institutions of social life. 
Kowalczyk: The idea of the secularization of the state in France was realized in 1905 
when the separation of the Church from the state was proclaimed. The revolutionary movements in 
many countries went still further, till the appearance of atheism was elevated to the status of state 
ideology. Hitlcrism was also a manifestation of this phenomenon. As was rightly noted by 
Vatican II, the autonomy of culture, politics, and economy is valid within the borders of 
unchangeable ethical principles. Apart from imposing doctrinal atheism, the most frequent form of 
state athcization is the propagation of legal norms contrary to religious ethics. It causes the 
diffusion of the so-called "atheism of the faithful," already mentioned previously. 
Pilka: But is God rejected only for conformistic-opportunistic reasons? For Camus the 
cause of atheism is an acute experience of evil which he could not explain in any other way than 
by the absence of a "good God." 
Kowalczyk: The evil which terrifies and strikes people has often been a cause of the loss 
of faith. In fact, it would be difficult to question the reality of evil. Using Camus' words, the world 
is "plague-stricken." That is why explanations undermining or diminishing the reality of evil are 
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unacceptable. And there have been many such explanations in the history of human thought. 
Oriental religions treat evil on a par with the visible world, an appearance hiding the inscrutable 
core of being. Spinoza tried to persuade us that evil is an effect of the superficiality and faultiness 
of human cognition. Saint Augustine explained evil as "a complementary color" of good. Finally, 
Leibniz, speaking about the best of possible worlds, may also provoke atheism. The theodicies of 
this type are unacceptable. How then should evil be explained? Christian philosophy treats evil as 
a lack of appropriate good. According to this philosophy, evil is not independent, primeval, 
substantial-autonomous. Evil is real, but as a property "accompanying" finite being. Ontic evil 
which ·people encounters in their lives-illness, natural calamities, death--does not destroy 
spiritual life and the eschatological sense of human existence. On the other hand, moral evil is an 
unavoidable consequence of human freedom; it is a "risk" of this freedom. By transferring people's 
evil on God, Kotarbnski treats people as puppets. Yet, there is no way of explaining evil till the 
end; for a Christian, it remains a mystery. A response to evil cannot be limited merely to an effort 
of reason alone but it must also be an act of love: Arthur Beyzim fought with the evil of leprosy 
and Father Kolbe with the evil of the tormentors of the concentration camp. By the sacrifice of his 
life Christ gave himself for the sins of the world. These are personal answers to this problem. 
Pilka: Poland belongs to that small group of European countries in which we observe a 
growth of religiosity. Has atheism ceased to be dangerous for Polish Catholicism, then? 
Kowalczyk: In the four post-World War II decades Christianity in Poland has retained its 
dominant position, although immediately after the war some part of the intelligentsia and youth 
succumbed to the fascination with the social ethos of Marxism. This fascination was decreasing 
with each successive socio-political crisis. At present only a small fraction of our nation still 
adheres to the atheistic world view. 
Pilka: Yet, doctrinal distance to atheism does not exclude its indirect influence on the 
shape of our religiosity. 
Kowalczvk: Yes, but it is most frequently an unconscious process, shaping mentality and 
the family and social ethos. For instance, the relativity contained in the conception of Marxist 
ethics spreads the sense of the relativity of Catholic moral norms. Yet, if Marxism places stronger 
emphasis on the relativism of the norms of individual ethics, then in some part of Polish society 
the ethics of social life undergoes atrophy. A consequence of this fact is a drastic deterioration of 
the ethics of labor, frequent encroachment on social property, etc. The resistance of Polish society 
to theoretical-doctrinal atheism constitutes a strong contrast to the same society yielding to 
atheism in the domain of the ethics of everyday life. The sensitivi
.
ty of the conscience becomes 
eroded and the criteria of good and evil undergo a change. The nation especially seems to yield to 
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. relativism and skepticism, particularly harmful in the case of young people who accept Christian 
ethics in a selective-situational manner. The Marxist postulate of making religion a private affair 
leads to the impoverishment of the conception of religious life, among others, by stripping it of 
significant ethical duties. This could perhaps explain the strange contrast between the mass scale of 
some manifestations of religious life and the growth of social moral vices-abortions, divorces, 
alcoholism, drug adqiction, etc. The ideology of secularism blurs the value of sacramental life, 
prayer, and grace in the consciousness of many CatholfCS. In Poland atheism seems to enter as if 
"by the back door." One cannot ignore these symptoms because to an increasing extent they shape 
the moral image of the nation, threatening not only its sensitivity but also its religious 
consciousness. 
Pilka: Thus, coming back to the question put at the beginning about the character of the 
present epoch, do we really live in a post-atheistic period? 
Kowalczvk: Atheism has made a strong impression on the modem epoch. On the one 
hand, it led to the formation of totalitarianisms, while on the other, it deprived people of higher 
values, leaving an ·existential void. Also the attempt to lead an easy life, avoiding fundamental 
existential questions, gives access to nihilism. Escaping from God, the human being tries to 
escape from his/her own call, from his/her own destiny. Contemporary culture tries to facilitate 
this escape, but the results are only too evident. For these reasons, apart from a strong atheizing 
tendency, we also observe a reverse phenomenon, a certain religious revival. The disappointment 
with scientistic philosophy particularly favors an intellectual rebirth of religious problems in 
modem culture. This may lead·to a re-Christianization of Europe. Thus, one �annot say with full 
conviction that atheism, especially of a doctrimil sort, has been the principal feature of the modern 
epoch. The tendency to a religious revival is first of all a fight for the human being, for human 
dignity. This fight has not·been decided definitely, as yet. The pontificate of John Paul Ii is 
characterized by confrontation with the atheizing tendencies of modernity. The Pope's efforts are 
determined by the defence of the person from idols which degrade human beings. 
Translated from Polish. 
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